“Here he knelt who did not have to, on behalf of those who did not want to kneel” – Willy Brandt in Warsaw, December 7, 1970.

The impact of a single poem can sometimes be more powerful than the content of a volume of scholarly studies on the same topic. Similarly, gestures are more memorable than any words. One such gesture is the way German Chancellor Willy Brandt paid tribute to the victims of the Holocaust in Warsaw on December 7, 1970.

For over two decades, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were led by individuals who had opposed the Nazis during the Third Reich. Both countries condemned the persecution and extermination of Jews between 1933 and 1945. However, it was the Federal Republic of Germany that took the role of actively expressing remorse for the crimes committed by representatives of the German state against the Jewish people. This occurred because, even before the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, at the turn of 1948/1949, the Soviet Union had adopted a deeply hostile stance toward Israel and the Zionist movement. Its policy in this area could be described as a manifestation of the Cold War waged by the communists against democratic countries independent of Moscow. This determined, among other things, the GDR's policy toward Israel, Zionism, and global Jewish organizations independent of Moscow. The Federal Republic of Germany, as a state encompassing most of Germany's lands and Germans, was not constrained by Soviet policy. Among other things, it was not limited by those elements of Soviet historical policy that aimed to minimize the narrative of the Holocaust as a unique crime, unprecedented in its nature and consequences.

For over a decade, the face of German efforts to establish contacts and cooperation with the Jewish state and Jewish organizations operating in the diaspora was the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer. Thanks to the position he developed and upheld by his successors, it became possible to establish permanent diplomatic contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel. This was a seemingly impossible task, considering what Jews experienced at the hands of representatives of the German Reich and the knowledge of the German government's plans for extermination against the entire Jewish nation. Holocaust survivors did not forget this, and many of them perceived establishing dialogue with the " nation of perpetrators " as a betrayal of the memory of those murdered and those who, although they emerged from the war alive, were robbed, devastated, and traumatized. The situation was not improved by the persistence of anti-Semitic sentiment in the Federal Republic of Germany and the occurrence of overtly anti-Semitic incidents, including verbal and even physical aggression. Following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, voices of condemnation of the Jewish state were raised in both German states. In the GDR, these voices formed part of a chorus directed from Moscow. In the Federal Republic, they came primarily from far-left circles, sympathizing with Arab states and Palestinian organizations hostile to Israel.

The Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition that governed the Federal Republic of Germany until almost the end of the 1960s was for nearly twenty years held hostage by the so-called Hallstein Doctrine. According to this doctrine, the Federal Republic of Germany did not maintain diplomatic relations with states that recognized the separate statehood of the GDR. This was one reason for the lack of formal relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic. Another reason was the government in Bonn's emphasis on the temporary nature of Poland's western border. One-third of the territory of the Polish People's Republic was treated in western Germany as territories under " temporary Polish administration ." This position, which provoked strong opposition in Poland, stemmed from the views of many millions of Germans who, for almost two decades, hoped for a change in the border status quo in the east. In this situation, intergovernmental dialogue between Warsaw and Bonn was out of the question. Since the late 1950s, gestures of readiness for cooperation had indeed been expressed by some segments of the citizens of these countries, primarily religious circles, but not by representatives of state agencies.

Fortunately for German-Polish relations, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic managed to assimilate approximately 12 million refugees and displaced persons from Central and Eastern Europe during the first two decades of their existence. The rising standard of living in the Federal Republic of Germany encouraged its citizens to defend their existing assets rather than to provoke a new European conflict. As a result, in the second half of the 1960s, over half of the German population expressed a willingness to accept the border changes in Europe made pursuant to the agreement between the victorious powers regarding Germany, adopted in Potsdam in August 1945. The shift in the majority of public opinion on this matter constituted the premise for the Federal Government to implement a new policy towards the countries of the so-called Eastern Bloc, starting in October 1969. A new government coalition was then formed, composed of Social Democrats and Liberals, and the office of Chancellor was entrusted to the renowned SPD politician Willy Brandt. A new beginning in Polish-German relations was all the more possible because in May of that year, the most important politician of the Polish People's Republic at the time, Władysław Gomułka, publicly announced his readiness to engage in dialogue with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Hallstein Doctrine was to be replaced by the doctrine of " change through rapprochement ." It should be remembered that the United States, still the primary guarantor of security for Western European democratic countries, also advocated for a change in the Federal Republic of Germany's relations with both the GDR and other countries of the so-called Eastern Bloc.

It must be admitted that the pace of action between the new Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic authorities was very rapid. Talks between representatives of the Warsaw and Bonn authorities took place from February to October 1970, and in November, the text of the treaty on the basis of normalization and mutual relations between the two countries was ready for signing. Independently, intensive German-Soviet diplomatic work continued, which resulted in an interstate treaty in August 1970. This signal sent from Moscow to all its dependent states. It certainly helped to successfully conclude the Bonn-Warsaw talks. On December 7, 1970, Chancellor Willy Brandt signed the aforementioned treaty in Warsaw. His government recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. This later resulted, among other things, in the establishment of interstate relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic.

The German government delegation's visit to Warsaw was relatively brief, but the German Chancellor decided to use it to also pay tribute to the citizens of the Republic of Poland – victims of the Third Reich's genocidal policies. Due to the Hallstein Doctrine, his predecessors were unable to do so on Polish soil. Willy Brandt did not waste the opportunity. He laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and expressed his wish to lay a wreath at the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw. Both events were given a solemn character. Besides politicians and diplomats, the large German delegation also included journalists and cultural figures interested in the changes in Polish-German relations, including the writer and visual artist Günther Grass. Unexpectedly, after laying the wreath, Chancellor Brandt knelt on both knees and remained in this position for a long time. We owe it to the numerous photographers and film crews for capturing this moment and making it available to the public worldwide. The kneeling gesture of homage by a politician of this rank was unprecedented. Historically, scholar Christian von Krockow placed it on the same level as the kiss of fraternal reconciliation shared by President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, symbolizing the end of a centuries-long conflict on the German-French border.

Brandt realized that by kneeling, he was not performing this gesture as a private citizen, but as a representative of a state with over 60 million citizens, and in a sense, also as a representative of those Germans who lived in the GDR and beyond and condemned the crimes committed by their compatriots during the war. Near the end of his life, he briefly reflected on that moment in front of the Ghetto Heroes' Monument. He wrote: " In the face of the abyss of German history and the burden of suffering of millions murdered, I did what people do when words fail ." The Chancellor stated that, before approaching the monument, he had to do much more than simply lay a wreath and bow his head, as is customary at such events. But he had not consulted his advisors, and his gesture surprised everyone.

One commentator stated: " Here he knelt who did not have to, on behalf of those who did not want to kneel ."

There is an ongoing dispute over whether Chancellor Brandt's gesture was an expression of tribute and sympathy only for Jews—victims of the Holocaust—or for all victims of the German occupiers in Poland, including those of other nationalities. None of the Chancellor's statements made immediately following his visit to Warsaw indicate that the tribute was addressed to all categories of victims of the German-Nazi genocidal policy, including Slavs, including Poles. However, a dozen or so years later, when journalist and publicist Adam Krzemiński suggested a more universal nature to the gesture, Brandt favored the interpretation, which led to the recognition of the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes as " the proper place to pay tribute to all victims of Nazi crimes ."

It is beyond dispute, however, that Willy Brandt was deeply convinced of the need to build good relations with the Jewish people, including Israel, regardless of the voices of his fellow citizens who held different views on the matter. The weekly Der Spiegel asked 500 readers how they assessed the Chancellor's gesture in front of the Warsaw monument. A staggering 48% considered it excessive ( übertrieben ), 41% considered it appropriate ( angemessen ), and 11% had no opinion. These figures, therefore, do not reflect overwhelming support for the head of government's move. Indeed, one could say that German society was deeply divided on this issue. At that time, the NPD nationalists were gaining between 7% and 10% of the vote in state parliamentary elections in individual states, and anti-Semitic acts were also occurring across the country. In the second half of 1969, German sympathizers of Israel's enemies interrupted Ambassador Asher Ben-Nathan's lectures with shouts of support for terrorist bombings targeting Israelis. At the University of Munich (sic!), a loud comment was made to a guest from Tel Aviv: " The fact that this ambassador is appearing before us should be considered a provocation. It can only be compared to a situation if Adolf Hitler descended from heaven to discuss concentration camps ." Comparing the Israeli representative to one of the greatest genocidal perpetrators in human history was unheard of, demonstrating ill will and a scale of misunderstanding of the situation that this country faced from the very beginning of its existence. And all this took place in a state where the most ardent German nationalists found refuge between 1919 and 1932. In a state where the first Nazi concentration camp – Dachau – was established.

Peter Boenisch, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Bild," commented on the Chancellor's actions as follows: " This Catholic nation [Poles] knows that one kneels only before God. And here comes some Western socialist, most likely unaffiliated with the Church, and bends the knee. This moves the nation. But does it also move the victims of Stalinism? " The renowned journalist thus questioned the entire policy of dialogue with the communist bloc. When Brandt learned of Beonisch's comment, he reacted very emotionally, and perhaps this reaction shows how important what he had done was to him personally. He then reportedly told a close associate face to face: " What could these wh...e know about whom I knelt before ?" Without a doubt, the former outspoken, radical opponent of Nazism was well aware of the terrible price the world paid for Adolf Hitler's 12 years of rule. And although he was innocent himself, he felt co-responsible for what was done in the name of all Germans.

Media coverage in the Polish People's Republic (PRL) minimized coverage of the Chancellor's behavior in front of the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes. A photograph of Brandt kneeling was published in "Życie Warszawy," the weekly "Forum," which presented a review of world press opinion, and in the magazine "Fołk-Sztyme," the organ of the Jewish Social and Cultural Association in Poland. However, it was omitted from the Polish Film Chronicle, a popular review of the most important events in Poland and around the world at the time, shown before every film screening. The sequence of decisions that generated this situation, which must have been made at the highest level, has not yet been examined. They certainly aligned with the historical policy practiced in the Polish People's Republic at the time, which ignored the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust and reduced Jews to just one of many categories of victims of the Polish hecatomb. The most striking expression of the silence about the distinctive wartime fate of Jews was the post-1968 writing about " 6 million Poles murdered and killed during the Nazi occupation ." For many years, Jews disappeared from the basic, synthetic, textbook account of Poland's losses during World War II. In this respect, the historical account in the Polish People's Republic became, to a certain extent, similar to that present in the Soviet Union since the late 1940s.

The Chancellor's gesture, although immediately disseminated by the international media, was not the most important topic on German public opinion's mind in those December days in the context of the Warsaw visit. Far more important were the consequences of the German-Polish agreement. Many Germans believed that he had betrayed the interests of the German national community by agreeing to a permanent union of a significant portion of the former Reich territory with postwar Poland. Those who shared this opinion voiced it loudly, sparing no harsh words. Activists and journalists from the nationwide association of so-called expellees were at the forefront of this. They failed to understand that a willingness to compromise was what their Western partners, as well as the Soviet Union, expected, and what would ultimately help secure their support for German reunification. As a politician who adapted his tactics and rhetoric to the current situation, Brandt maintained the position that " small steps are better than big words ." One might add: than big but empty words. The Chancellor's Warsaw gesture can also be interpreted in the context of political pragmatism. Bogdan Musiał points out that it was " empty ," without practical significance, since the SPD, of which Brandt was a key figure, tolerated the blatant sluggishness of the Federal Republic of Germany's justice system between 1949 and 1970 in prosecuting its own citizens who had been complicit in the crime of genocide during World War II. However, it must be remembered that, when millions of former members of Nazi organizations had the right to vote in the Federal Republic of Germany, a tough policy towards them risked a seizure of power by forces that were utterly unwilling to condemn the Nazi regime. Therefore, in this matter, too, a tactic of " small steps " was necessary. It was impossible to allow, for example, the NPD to become a significant element of the German political scene. And this was achieved. Ultimately, the Warsaw Agreement and Brandt's gesture of December 7, 1970, became another milestone in Germany's journey away from the Nazi past and its consequences.

It is the duty of visionaries and statesmen to point out the right directions and models for the communities for which they are responsible, regardless of current difficulties. History has proven Brandt right both regarding the agreement with Poland and the sign of atonement for the victims of the Holocaust. The new Eastern policy of the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition enabled the Federal German Chancellor to travel to the capital of a country that experienced a hecatomb between 1939 and 1945, and where the occupiers murdered most of the Holocaust victims. There is no indication that Willy Brandt, with his moving gesture, acted against his own convictions. Quite the contrary. At the same time, he demonstrated that the assumption of the helm of government by a new team would not stand in the way of reconciliation and cooperation between a democratic Germany and the Jewish people, even if this were to happen without the support of some of his compatriots. This course of action is maintained by the Federal German government to this day.

Grzegorz Berendt

Photo: public domain